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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
The recent proposal of a European Electronic Communications Markets Authority 
(EECMA) by the European Commission has turned out to be the most high profile and 
controversial element of the latest review of the EU’s telecommunications regulatory 
framework, begun in 2006. This article argues that creating EECMA would amount to a 
radical departure in the direction of supranationalism for a system which has developed 
over 20 years a predominantly ‘intergovernmental’ character. However, the political 
aftermath to, and likely rejection of, the proposal provide a candid illustration of the 
robustness of national level interests in what is widely viewed as one of the most 
Europeanised parts of the communications sector. This eventuality is, however, unlikely 
to speed progress towards the creation of the Single European Market in 
telecommunications, a communications policy goal of the EU since 1987. 
 
  
INTRODUCTION 
In 1987, the European Commission in a landmark Green Paper declared its aspiration to 
create the Single European Market (SEM) in telecommunications. Given the historic path 
of development of telecommunications across the then 12 members of the EU, this was a 
radical statement of intent. Until the early 1980s, the provision of telecommunications 
services was almost exclusively state-centric, in the hands of a series of monopoly state-
owned Postal, Telegraph and Telephone (PTT) administrations. However, by the late 
1980s, there were signs of disruptive change to what was one of the most stable of the 
utility sectors. First in the UK, and, thereafter, across a number of the leading economic 
members of the EU, telecommunications came to be considered a sector in which market 
competition could be developed in new service areas and internationalisation 
countenanced, to some extent at least. For the EU, a policy ‘window of opportunity’ thus 
materialised which the European Commission, interested in expanding its set of policy 
responsibilities, proved keen to exploit (Schneider, Dang-Nguyen and Werle 1994). Thus 
began a by now well-documented policy journey in pursuit of the SEM in 
telecommunications. 
Twenty years on, the Commission’s latest review of the state of the 
telecommunications sector illustrated that whilst a transformation has occurred in the 
governance of telecommunications across a now 27 member EU, the completion of the 
SEM is still a policy goal. At the national level, monopoly state ownership has been 
replaced by comprehensive and detailed independent public regulation of a complex, 
differentiated series of telecommunications markets (Thatcher 1999). At the EU level, a 
plethora of legislation – the Electronic Communications Regulatory Framework (ECRF) 
in its current incarnation – sets the broad conditions for competitive functioning of these 
telecommunications markets (Humphreys and Simpson 2005). However, the Commission 
has articulated the persistence of a number of core impediments to competition. As a 
solution, it initially proposed radical institutional expansion at the EU level in the form of  
the European Electronic Communications Market Authority (EECMA) (European 
Commission 2007).  
The EECMA initiative provides an interesting example of the limits to supranational 
institution building in what is, ironically, perceived widely to be one of the most 
Europeanised parts of the electronic communications sector in terms of governance. 
EECMA was comprehensively opposed by a range of regulatory and governmental actors 
from the national level, as well as the European Parliament. The article contends that in 
its originally proposed form, the Authority represented a radical departure from the kind 
of telecommunications governance which has developed to date at EU level. Its 
paramount ‘supranationality’ would have tilted the politico-institutional balance too 
much in the direction of the EU and away from the national level. Telecommunications 
governance to date has been primarily – though far from exclusively - 
‘intergovernmental’ in character. That is, decision making power is mostly in the hands 
of national level interests even in the regulatory-institutional forms created for it at the 
European level, the most notable of which is the European Regulators Group (ERG). The 
latter’s status would have been to a considerable extent ‘supra-nationalised’ had the 
original Commission proposal been accepted. Instead, the new Authority will be a 
regulatory product reflective of a much more evolutionary and path dependent policy 
trajectory. In this process, national level actors and interests remain strongest, though 
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European level interests, most often articulated through the European Commission, will 
gain influential ground. Such a movement is inevitable, if the SEM project in 
telecommunications is to amount to something significantly more than a collection of  
largely separate national markets functioning along broadly similar liberalised lines. 
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides a brief resume of the core 
politico-institutional features of the development of EU telecommunications policy to the 
point of the 2006 review. It highlights, in particular, the institutional character and 
evolutionary path of telecommunications policy development at EU level, which, it is 
argued, is crucial to an understanding of why the Commission’s original proposal for 
EECMA mutated into the form likely to be accepted by Member States. The third section 
of the paper focuses on the politics of the EECMA process itself, highlighting the often 
fractious interaction between the European Commission on the one hand, and the 
European Regulators Group, on the other. From this, the main core structural and 
functional characteristics of the original and later forms of the EECMA proposal are 
explored. The final section of the paper draws some conclusions on the lessons which can 
be drawn from what has turned out to have been one of the most controversial aspects of 
EU telecommunications policy since the late 1980s.  
 
THE POLITICO-INSTITUTIONAL CHARACTER OF EU 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
Any decision by Member States to create and develop a new area of policy at the EU 
level is always underpinned by consideration of the extent to which loss of sovereignty is 
likely and can be sanctioned. Intergovernmentalists view European integration as a series 
of outcomes from a process of bargaining between Member States (Morazcsik 1998). 
Integration, and its manifestation in institutions at the EU level, can only proceed as a 
function of Member States willingness to concur that such a process is sanctionable in the 
national interest. Supranationalists, by contrast, focus on the active role which institutions 
created at the EU level can subsequently play in further integration (Tsbelis and Garrett 
2001). The creation of supranational policy apparatus at EU level has the potential to 
create scope for further development though a spiral of institutional development (Stone 
Sweet and Sandholtz 1997). Two important issues arise from an analysis of this kind: 
first, the requirement to characterise the precise nature of institutionalisation and, second, 
to explain how the process develops, if at all. A key feature of the emergence of the EU 
as an international actor over the last 20 years has been its development as a governance 
space for liberalising markets. In the process, the EU level has become an increasingly 
important context for regulatory action in a number of sectors of the economy, not least 
telecommunications.  
 
By the mid 1980s a number of EU states, most notably the UK as a forerunner, had begun 
to cede direct control over telecommunications to new independent public national 
regulatory authorities (NRAs) (Thatcher 2002) whose role it was to manage the evolution 
of the sector along competitive lines. The emergence of this US-style approach to 
telecommunications vested great responsibility in, and thus give great power to, the 
regulatory authority to create and police the set of detailed rules required to deliver even 
a minimum level of competition. It also unleashed a growing number of large, 
increasingly commercially-oriented, telecommunications service providers which tended 
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to be the main subject of regulation given their status as incumbents in well established 
and newly emerging markets. On the demand side, the intensification of the most recent 
phase of economic globalisation through the 1980s prompted multinational enterprise 
telecommunications customers to exert pressure for telecommunications services to be 
made available to them to facilitate their international corporate function. The 
replacement of state ownership by independent regulation led to the argument that the 
‘regulatory state’ (Seidman and Gilmour 1986) had emerged in telecommunications at 
the national level. 
These important changes suggested to the European Commission – by the mid-1980s 
a well established and ambitious actor on the EU stage - that the coordination of 
telecommunications market regulation might be explored as a means of facilitating the 
future development of the sector (European Commission 1984). Given the nature of the 
EU, with 10 and, as the 1980s proceeded, 12 different telecommunications sectors, the 
Commission quickly came to the opinion that a legislative package was required to frame 
the internationalisation of  telecommunications governance to the EU level. It was also 
clear that any movement towards the Europeanisation of telecommunications through the 
EU route needed to be conducted tentatively, to reflect national Member State 
preferences specifically. The Commission’s Green Paper on creating the SEM in 
telecommunications (European Commission 1987), whilst bold in its overall goal, was 
more modest in its specific proposals. It argued for EU-wide competition in the markets 
for telecommunications terminal equipment and value-added services yet simultaneously 
declared the right of Member States to maintain on a monopoly basis so-called reserved 
services, principally voice telephony. 
The tentativeness of the European Commission reflects the classic position of 
political fragility which any EU institution keen to effect supranationalisation in a policy 
area faces (Humphreys and Simpson 1996). It is also indicative of the power differential 
existent between the national and the European level. The especially deep national 
centricity of telecommunications added resonance to the situation. Yet within merely 
seven years of the Green Paper’s publication, EU Member States had agreed to liberalise 
all their telecommunications markets and infrastructures facilitated through the passage 
and subsequent implementation of a battery of EU legislation (European Council of 
Ministers 1993; European Council of Ministers 1994). In order for this swift and 
remarkable transition to occur Members States needed to be assured of its benefits. 
Certain of the most powerful of them – the UK, Germany and France, bolstered 
subsequently by accessions from Scandanavia - became convinced that there were more 
opportunities than threats from the liberalisation of telecommunications domestically and 
internationally. Such views on the neo-liberal agenda in telecommunications were by no 
means identical (Hulsink 1999). Differences existed regarding the extent to which 
liberalisation should occur, as well as its timing (Humphreys and Simpson 2005). The EU 
policy arena provided an important and relatively secure and controllable context for this 
to take place initially. The EU also allowed Member States like France, which still valued 
the public service traditions of telecommunications even in an increasingly competitive 
environment (Humphreys 1990), to ensure that legislative provision was secured at EU 
level to protect universal service. Thus, the first important steps in the development of 
EU telecommunications policy were legislative with a key institutional role for the 
European Commission soon emerging. However, thereafter, the more complex the 
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legislative apparatus became, the greater was the need to broaden the institutional 
apparatus in service of its implementation and development. 
Recent work by Thatcher and Coen (2008: 807-08) has analysed the features of what 
is described as the European regulatory space. A particular feature has been a ‘thickening 
of organisations and rules concerning regulation. In short a process of 
‘institutionalisation’ has taken place’. This has taken various forms and has proceeded to 
differing degrees across sectors. It ranges from EU supervision and monitoring of  
regulation undertaken by National Regulatory Authorities; through to European 
Networks of Regulators composed of NRAs and often the European Commission. More 
formally established institutions at the EU level are manifest as European Regulatory 
Agencies with varying degrees of power from recommendation making to adoption of 
legally binding decisions. Beyond this, nothing currently exists though the creation of 
Federal European Regulatory Agencies (FERAs) and Single European Regulators (SERs) 
are institutional possibilities. The former would make rules at the European level to be 
implemented by subordinate NRAs; the latter, a European level body, would be solely 
responsible for implementation and would be composed of members with a direct 
European remit. Control over FERAs and SERs would be conferred on national member 
states, the European Parliament and European Commission in a desired configuration. 
Strong evidence exists, particularly in the network industries that existing institutional 
arrangements at EU level are key determinants of further developments. The latter 
proceed in a gradual, path-dependent and evolutionary manner. Here, institutional change 
is innovative rather than inventive, where institutional conversion (creating new 
organisational forms from existing ones) and institutional layering (addition of new 
organisations to existing arrangements) are in strong evidence. This can be accounted for 
by periodic revisions which take place from within existing arrangements advocating 
change. Importantly, ‘[e]xisting organisations often make proposals, which usually 
involve their development and enhancement’ whilst, as a corollary, there is also 
resistance to any diminution of their authority (p829). Saliently for the case of EECMA, 
it is argued that in cases of institutional reorganisation, the European Commission can 
find itself in a relatively weak position, due to its limited resources, vis a vis other 
institutional bodies which exist at the European level but which are able to draw 
significant support from national level interests. However, evolutionary change has been 
significant and has created some considerable degree of centralisation through the 
creation and coordination of cross-EU regulatory networks (ibid: 810-15). 
In telecommunications, a debate has arisen on the role which supranational forces 
played in the evolution of telecommunications governance at the EU level. Some 
emphasise the entrepreneurial role played by the European Commission in driving the EU 
telecommunications policy agenda forward (Sandholtz 1998). Others stress the essential 
intergovernmentalism of the process, Thatcher (2001) arguing that, whilst a significant 
player, the European Commission acted much more as a partner of EU Member States. 
There is no doubt that the Commission was prepared to ‘take on’ Member States, as 
evidenced in its use of the article 86 procedure of the EU Treaty to force through 
liberalisation directives in terminal equipment (European Commission 1988) and services 
(European Commission 1990). The legal challenges presented to the Commission’s 
action were rejected by the European Court of Justice (European Court of Justice 1991; 
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1992) thus raising the possibility of significant supranational power to force through 
further telecommunications liberalisation being available to the Commission to exercise.  
However, in practice, it has proven more anxious to pursue compromise and 
consensus among EU Member States, something suggests uncharacteristic elements to 
the original proposal of EECMA. Since 1990, liberalisation directives have only been 
passed using article 86 as a matter of procedure, as a consequence of the legal cases of 
the late 1980s. Equally, the different developmental phases of EU telecommunications 
policy, which can be viewed as movements through a successive series of policy 
equillibria (Simpson 2008), have been prefaced by major consultation exercises, these 
having taking place in 1992, 1999, and 2006 respectively. Such exercises have triggered 
significant reorganisation and development of EU telecommunications policy pursued 
through the legislative route. In July 1993 Member States agreed to liberalise all voice 
telephonic services across the EU by 1998 (European Council of Ministers 1993), 
proceeded a year later by similar agreement regarding telecommunications infrastructures 
(European Council of Ministers 1994). This required a battery of subsequent legislation, 
both liberalising and harmonising in scope, including legislation setting minimum 
standards for universal service (Natalicchi 2001). In 2003, as a result of the review 
launched in 1999, the EU undertook a legislative rationalisation telecommunications 
regulation where the by then expansive number of directives framing the functioning of 
the sector was reduced from 20 to 7 in a newly named Electronic Communications 
Regulatory Framework (ECRF). The current ECRF review aims to undertake further 
significant rationalisation, the aim being to remove as much sector specific ex-ante 
regulation from the system as possible, instead leaving the governance of most 
telecommunications markets to the general EU competition law framework, an area in 
which the EU’s powers are particularly well-developed.  
Since the late 1980s, it is clear that a well established, developing system of 
legislation has couched the evolution of the telecommunications sector across the 
expanding EU. In this respect, EU telecommunications policy can be described as 
‘supranational’ in nature. However, the vast majority of the legislative measures agreed 
by Member States are in the form of directives which give considerable scope to Member 
States for interpretation within the relevant national legal tradition. The more well 
established and detailed EU telecommunications policy has become, the more elaborate is 
the regulatory apparatus and more intensive the regulatory workload across the EU to 
deliver its various parameters, despite recent moves to legislative rationalisation. Here, it 
is possible to argue that telecommunications provides a clear example of the creation and 
functioning of a ‘regulatory’ state in Europe (Majone, 1996; Seidman and Gilmour 1986). 
A complex two-level, pluri-lateral governance network (Humphreys and Simpson, 2008) 
has developed across the EU in which a variety of public regulatory actors interact in the 
functioning of the sector. This network, operating at national and EU level, is 
predominantly intergovernmental in nature, even regarding policy deliberation which 
occurs in European level contexts.  
In practice, the substance of the legislation comprising the ECRF is implemented on a 
‘day to day’ basis by a series of National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs). A major 
development was the creation of the European Regulators Group as a consequence of the 
1999 review of electronic communications. This independent (i.e. not established as part 
of the formal EU decision-making framework), advisory committee contains 
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representatives from the EU’s telecommunications NRAs and is, importantly, resourced   
- and Chaired in a non-voting capacity - by the Commission. The ERG’s modus-operandi 
is essentially intergovernmental in nature, though the presence of the Commission has 
afforded the latter a kind of supervisory perspective which has proved fundamentally 
important in influencing the proposal to create EECMA. In essence, the Commission has, 
by its own admission, aimed towards the creation of some kind of regulatory partnership 
with Member States’ NRAs. By contrast, the relationship between the ERG and the 
European Commission has been recognised as difficult in the first instance, though 
improving (Reding, 2007) reflecting the tension that has existed between the national and 
the EU level for a considerable part of the history of EU telecommunications policy.  
Thus, EU Member States and the European Commission though having resolved to 
pursue the common goal of liberalisation in telecommunications have often been uneasy 
co-participants in the enterprise and the development of EU telecommunications policy 
has frequently manifest itself as a tussle between supranational ambition and 
intergovernmental resolve. The Commission has been motivated by the functional goal of 
creating and administering the EU telecommunications regulatory framework, as well as 
cementing politically its institutional role in the European and global telecommunications 
policy landscape. National Member States  - and to a lesser extent their NRAs – have 
struggled with a core dilemma of neo-liberalism: the pursuit of internationally 
competitive markets holds the attendant risk of damaging national commercial interests. 
As a consequence, often Member States have aimed to create only the degree and pattern 
of competition that is perceived to be in the national, not necessarily the European, 
interest. The consequence has been efforts by the Commission to see transferred to the 
European level (not necessarily its own institutional quarters) sufficient policy leverage 
to make the neo-liberal project in telecommunications across the EU a ‘European’ 
project. The corollary generated has been efforts by Member States at resisting this. In 
response to this dilemma, the 1994 Bangemann Report recommended the creation of a 
European level regulatory authority for telecommunications (Bangemann Report 1994). 
This idea was not pursued by Member States, yet it re-surfaced in two subsequent, 
related, reviews of the mid to late 1990s, the 1997 review of the regulatory consequences 
of ICT convergence (European Commission 1997) and the subsequent 1999 Review of 
Electronic Communications (European Commission 1999).  As part of the negotiations 
leading to the ECRF which the latter review prefaced, the Commission proposed the 
creation of a High Level Communications Group, composed of members of NRAs, on 
which it would be granted have voting rights. This proposed injection of ‘Commission 
supranationalism’ was fiercely resisted by Member States, resulting in the creation of the 
ERG by way of compromise, a much more path dependent outcome in structure and 
function.  
 
THE 2006 REVIEW OF THE ECRF AND PROPOSAL OF EECMA 
The current EU telecommunications review illustrates two contrasting features of the 
evolving system. On the one hand, the extent to which the regulatory state in 
telecommunications has become embedded at the national and European levels is 
strikingly in evidence. Yet on the other, it is also clear that a comprehensive, efficiently 
functioning SEM in telecommunications has by no means been completed. In June 2006, 
the Commission launched a by now familiar (this time two phase) consultation process 
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on further possible modification of the ECRF, through laying out a series of proposals for 
interested parties to reflect upon. These modifications had six main dimensions: the 
creation of a new approach to regulation of the radio spectrum; action to rationalise and 
make more efficient the well-established system of telecommunications market reviews 
undertaken by NRAs in conjunction with the Commission; a series of measures with the 
goal of consolidating the SEM in telecommunications, prominent among which was the 
proposal of a right of veto for the Commission over market remedies; a series of 
measures focused on improving the public service dimension of telecommunications 
provision;  a proposed new set of regulatory requirements on NRAs and communications 
services providers to improve security; and four measures of what were described as a 
modernisation and updating kind, the most substantive of which was the repeal of the 
2000 Regulation on local loop unbundling (European Parliament and Council 2000) such 
was the degree of competition now deemed in existence in Member States’ local loops 
(European Commission 2006a; European Commission 2006b). Very importantly, at this 
juncture any proposal to create EECMA was highly conspicuous by its absence. 
However, a year later, in November 2007, after the consultation phase had concluded, 
the Commission released a report to Member States in which its proposed changes were 
re-presented under three broad categories, the proposal of EECMA assuming centre stage 
in one of these. Under the heading of so-called ‘better regulation’ came a radical and 
what has turned out to be unpopular proposal to reduce, from 18 to 7, the number of 
telecommunications markets subject to ex-ante regulation, as well as  ones to simplify the 
market review procedure and radio spectrum regulation. A second category, ‘connecting 
with citizens’ grouped the initial proposals for universal service and security. Thirdly, 
‘completing the single market in electronic communications’ now contained the proposal 
to create EECMA based on the persistence of ‘regulatory inconsistency and distortions of 
competition’ (European Commission 2007a: 4). EECMA would also be accompanied by 
a strengthening of the independence and regulatory enforcement powers of NRAs. The 
formerly most controversial element of the initial proposals, the proposed right of veto on 
remedies for the Commission, was now described as an oversight role to be undertaken in 
cooperation with the new authority, which had by now eclipsed it as the most 
controversial element of the proposed alterations to the ECRF. The revised proposals 
were accompanied by two new draft directives and a draft regulation related to the 
establishment of EECMA. 
In its summary review document, the justification for EECMA was couched in terms 
of strong signals sent to the Commission as a result of the second phase of the 
consultation on the ECRF review. Here, the Commission reported criticism of the ERG’s 
performance which it was argued delivered ‘only loose coordination among regulators’ 
and a ‘“lowest common denominator” approach’. Despite this, it was acknowledged 
explicitly that ‘Member States had reservations about “ceding powers” to the 
Commission’ (European Commission 2007a: 9). The industry support which the 
Commission so often in the past drew on to justify its action was also present now, 
though far from overwhelming in nature. The Commission claimed that new 
telecommunications players along with ‘some’ (ibid) incumbents were in favour of either 
institutional reform of the ERG or a stronger role for the Commission, though neither of 
these preferences suggest automatically the creation of an entirely new organisation like 
EECMA.  
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THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, THE ERG AND THE POLITICS OF EECMA 
The proposal by the European Commission of EECMA was not included in either 
phases of the consultation on the review of the ECRF. However, in June 2006, Viviane 
Reding announced the Commission’s intention to create a European level regulatory 
authority for telecommunications in order to deliver a more effectively functioning EU 
telecommunications market (Financial Times, 28.6.06; European Voice 16.11.06; 
Sutherland 2008). It appears that the Commission’s ongoing conflict with the German 
government over proposed legislation to afford a regulatory holiday to the German 
incumbent Deutsche Telekom to allow it to invest in broadband infrastructure free from 
competition, was a significant factor in strengthening the Commission’s resolve to 
propose EECMA (European Voice, 16.11.06). However, Reding’s individual motivation 
for seeing EECMA placed on the ECRF regulatory agenda is abundantly clear in her 
declaration that she had ‘personally insisted that the idea of creating a European telecom 
regulator…[was]…included as a policy option’ (Reding 2006, cited in Sutherland 2008: 
14). 
The creation of the new authority along the lines proposed by the Commission 
effectively amounted to an attempted institutional ‘supranationalisation’ of the ERG. The 
Commission’s declaration of intent signalled the onset of a period of negotiation with the 
ERG right up to the point of the publication of final reform proposals to Member States 
in November 2007. Analysis of this gives a clear indication of the fractious politics of the 
initiative, where the Commission and the ERG’s Head ‘often did not agree with each 
other’ (Reding 2007c: 10). The idea for EECMA was also bound up in the bid by the 
Commission, articulated at the outset of the consultation, to secure extension of its veto to 
the regulatory remedies proposed by NRAs. In November 2006, in an apparent softening 
of her initial stance, Viviane Reding wrote to the ERG, appearing to use the proposal to 
create, what was at that time described as ‘“the enhanced ERG”’, instead of pursuing 
extra Commission powers regarding remedies. She here claimed willingness to ‘give 
serious consideration to the option of relying in future on the ERG and national 
regulatory authorities for more consistency in the internal market’. However, tellingly, 
she also noted that ‘concrete proposals are needed for new institutional arrangements that 
would transform the ERG into a more efficient and more accountable permanent body 
with independent powers for ensuing consistency in the application of the regulatory 
framework (Reding 2006a: 2). The intention was that the ERG ‘would be transformed, by 
means of a legal instrument to be adopted by the European Parliament and the Council of 
Ministers into a new permanent and independent body responsible for electronic 
communications networks and markets
This bargaining position was re-emphasised by Fabio Colasanti, deputy to Reding, in 
a follow-up communication to the ERG which took place after a meeting between both 
parties in January 2007. The political carrot for the ERG presented here was the 
possibility of taking over regulatory control for the enforcement of the ‘article 7’ 
procedure (relating to the Commission’s limited veto powers in the ECRF decisions on 
the existence of  Significant Market Power in designated telecommunications markets) 
or, more specifically, a proposed modified form to include remedies. This would also 
’ (Reding 2006a: 4, emphasis in original).  
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clearly have dissolved the brewing discontent over the Commission’s desire to extend 
involvement here. The less politically involved alternative was also presented, namely 
that the ERG undertake such work in an advisory capacity only (Colasanti 2007) leaving 
the consequent regulatory enforcement duties to the Commission, something more akin to 
the current role of the ERG. Somewhat boldly, the Commission, in this communication, 
also raised the possibility of the new regulatory body assuming some responsibility for 
communications content regulation, this justified on the basis of the move in this 
direction made by some NRAs (ibid), giving a strong flavour of the ambitious mood the it 
appeared to be in.  
In late February 2007, the ERG provided a detailed position on the Commission’s 
proposals expressing outright opposition to the use of a ‘veto as a formal oversight 
mechanism’ (Viola 2007: annex 2, p1) contained in both of the institutional options 
presented to it by the Commission. Instead, it put forward a much more limited  - though 
unrealistic - development of the Article 7 provisions into a ‘more streamlined and 
targeted approach’ (Viola 2007: annex 2, p2). Here, after 2010, NRAs could provide 
market reviews to the ERG which it would scrutinise, though only at the request of an 
NRA or the Commission, or its own self-initiative. In fact, consideration of Article 7 
issues, it argued, would become the exception rather than the rule. This was justified on 
the rather dubious assumption that by then ‘“consistency” will become less and less of an 
issue’ (ibid). The ERG was more amenable to extending its powers in respect of ‘a 
regulatory “coordination” function, rather than on article 7’ (Viola 2007: annex 2, p3). It 
appeared not to be averse to the enhancement of its remit, though it did not want its 
institutional status changed in the process from fundamentally ‘intergovernmental’ to 
‘supranational’. 
Two weeks prior to the Commission’s mid-November 2007 publication of its 
proposals for the modification of the ECRF, the ERG put forward a final position 
statement with a view to influencing the outcome of the Commission’s deliberations. 
Essentially reiterating its previous position, the document again tried at length to 
demonstrate how the ERG had made significant achievements already, going beyond 
what might reasonably be expected from a consultation body. It made detailed reference 
to the series of reform measures (enunciated in the Madeira Declaration) enacted at the 
end of 2006, amounting to what it described as ‘a major step-change’. Notable among 
these is an agreement with the pan-European institutionally overlapping International 
Regulators Group (established in 1997) to ensure that the ERG’s Secretariat would be in 
the future better resourced financially to undertake its business. The ERG also introduced 
majority voting. The performance of the ERG has not been helped by its closed method 
of functioning with only minimal reportage of its business released into the public 
domain (Sutherland 2008).These moves can be seen as an attempt to align further the 
ERG away from the EU and the Commission -  it certainly appeared to be interpreted as 
such by the latter. The ERG Chair argued that ‘amendment to the ERG Decision could 
reflect the proposals outlined…with minimum delay, and at minimum cost and 
bureaucratic impact, and in particular without the need for a complex and lengthy 
legislative process’ (Viola 2007: 4).   
 
 
EECMA: INSTITUTIONAL FEATURES AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
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The Commission issued its proposals for reform on November 13 2007, which 
essentially reflected the position held in the negotiations with the ERG throughout 2007. 
The draft regulation that would establish EECMA gives a clear indication of the extent to 
which it would have created supranational institutional authority in EU 
telecommunications governance. EECMA would be an independent body established at 
the EU institutional level, accountable to the European Parliament. Very importantly, it 
would only play an advisory role for the Commission on core regulatory matters. 
EECMA was to be established according to the general principles created in 2005 by the 
Commission, and recently further elaborated (European Commission 2008) for the 
functioning of European regulatory agencies. It would be governed directly by a Board 
comprising the heads of the EU’s telecommunications NRAs overseen by an 
Administrative Board (European Commission 2007b).   
The Commission was unequivocal, in proposing EECMA, in its criticism of the 
current pattern of regulation in the ECRF. Appearing not to take account of the 
aforementioned changes in ERG voting, it was particularly critical of the modus operandi 
of the ERG where it argued that consensus-based decision-making meant that ‘common 
approaches [were] difficult and slow to achieve’ or even ‘impossible’ where  substantial 
differences existed between regulators. It cited a number of regulatory deficiencies in the 
ERG’s performance, such as divergent remedies at the national level, variations in rights 
of use conditions, the existence of different numbers nationally for the same transnational 
service and ineffectual handling of cross-border disputes (European Commission 2007: 
16). The Commission was also overtly critical of the IRG hinting at an unsatisfactory 
relationship between it and the ERG where the former ‘influences Community regulatory 
approaches [yet] has neither any obligation to implement Community Law nor any duty 
to report to the Commission’ (European Commission 2007: 5). In a subsequent 
explanatory communication from Vivane Reding to the ERG, in December 2007, the 
legal establishment of the IRG as a private law body was criticised as ‘add[ing] some 
complexity and yet another player to the regulatory process in addition to the ERG’ 
(Reding 2007c: 5).  
In dismissing the possibility of creating a strengthened ERG with more incisive 
decision-making powers (instead of EECMA) through instigation of majority voting, the 
Commission argued that, procedurally, such a change would still not allow the ERG to 
issue binding decisions on its members, since legally only the Commission is able to do 
this (European Commission 2007: 6). The Commission also argued that, structurally and 
procedurally, the ERG needed a major overhaul requiring an injection of resources that 
could only come from the EU, since ‘the Commission must be sure that its opinions and 
advice are transparent, accountable and independent’ (ibid). The only solution, argued the 
Commission, was for the ERG to be transformed into ‘a Community body subject to the 
same rules of administration and budget that apply to all community bodies’ (ibid), thus 
serving to internalise the kind of detailed work essential to the smooth functioning of the 
‘regulatory’ state at the European and national levels in telecommunications.  
The clear supranational nature of EECMA is evident in the Commission’s claim that 
it would reinforce the powers of NRAs ‘by taking over the functions of the ERG and 
giving them a robust and transparent foundation in Community law’ (ibid).  EECMA was 
also necessary to deal with a growing number of regulatory issues of a transnational 
nature which were not within the remit, by definition, of NRAs. Here, mobile and IP 
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based services were specifically mentioned. In its bid to create EECMA, it is clear that 
the Commission anticipated a comprehensive attitudinal transformation among NRA 
members that would make it up, itself a classic element of supranationalisation. 
EECMA’s proposed Board of Regulators would ‘comprise the heads of NRAs and will 
work in the Community interest’ (European Commission 2007: 9) which is something 
rather different from the operational philosophy of the ERG. It has also been reported that 
the Commission intended EECMA to be much less consultative than the ERG has been 
(European Voice, 30.8.07). Very importantly, the draft regulation to establish EECMA 
stipulated that its Board would take action on the basis of a simple majority vote 
(European Commission 2007: 37). It would be responsible for undertaking the main bulk 
of EECMA’s work, referred to in articles 4-23 of the draft regulation, including approval 
of its programme of work for a forthcoming year. The Administrative Board of EECMA 
would be responsible for the formal appointment of the Board of Regulators and the 
Board of Appeal. It would adopt annually the EECMA workplan (after consultation with 
the Commission) and annual report on EECMA’s activities, both of which it would be 
required to send to the European Parliament, the Council of Ministers and the 
Commission itself (European Commission 2007: 36). 
Reaction to the proposal of EECMA beyond the confines of the ERG was on the 
whole equally negative. The EU was considered not to be in a ‘political mood…to set up 
more supra-national bodies’ (Financial Times, 29.6.06). Rather, the EECMA initiative 
had ‘irked almost everyone. Member states, big industry operators, fellow commissioners 
and even the watchdogs themselves have problems with it’ (Financial Times 16.11.07; 
see also O’Brien 2007). The UK regulator, Ofcom, maintained that the current regulatory 
power balance between the Commission and NRAs was appropriate and argued that the 
‘proposal for a central regulator received little support during the creation of the existing 
rules [1999-2002] and we see no reason why it might be appropriate now’ (Laitner, 2006: 
1). It praised the political independence of the ERG as a particularly attractive quality, 
arguing that EECMA would be subject to political interference by both the Commission 
and Member States (Financial Times, 30.10.07). The European Parliament’s view of the 
EECMA proposal was equally hostile, suggesting that the Commission had misjudged the 
likely reaction of the other EU institution with most supranational predilections alongside 
itself. Its Rapporteur on the initiative even countered with a proposal to create the so-
called Body of European Regulators in Telecoms (BERT), which amounted to little more 
than a re-named version of the ERG (Humphreys 2008). In the initial consideration of the 
proposal in the Council of Ministers, the EU has unsurprisingly reported significant 
opposition from Member States (European Council of Ministers 2007: 10). Given this 
level of negativity, it has even been suggested that the proposal of EECMA is a political 
tactic of the European Commission, where Viviane Reding ‘outlines outlandish ideas, 
then waits for the air to clear before returning to the table to get the deal she really 
wants’, in this case, possibly, some form of greater power for the EU over 
telecommunications regulation (Laitner 2007: 1).  
 
CONCLUSION 
Despite its role as champion, on the one hand, and ‘honest broker’, on the other, of 
neo-liberal competition in telecommunications, the European Commission’s ‘policy 
entrepreneurial’ activities aimed at enhancing the EU’s institutional remit in 
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telecommunications has never been far from the surface of the policy debate. The 
EECMA initiative is, in part, simply the latest incarnation of this. On the one hand, 
Commissioner Reding has argued that ‘Centralism has no place in Europe. Instead, 
decentralisation is a guiding principle of European law’ (Reding 2007: 4), yet on the 
other she has claimed that EECMA ‘needs to bring out the best of the national regulators, 
but it needs – and this is crucial – it needs to be more than just the sum of all its national 
parts. It needs… to have a European approach, a European vision’ (Reding 2007: 4).  
The EECMA proposal also provides an interesting case of the persistent reticence of 
Member States to cede authority to the EU level in the communications sector despite 
more than two decades of relatively successful Europeanisation in telecommunications 
policy. However, through this period, the EU route has been used for the purposes of 
liberalisation and harmonisation of national market structures and procedures and little 
more than this. What exists at present is a series of liberalised markets, largely 
unintegrated at EU level. The Single European Market in telecommunications, 
frustratingly for the European Commission, is akin to a political banner underpinned by 
an unevenly held policy aspiration between national and European level interests. 
What steps then, if any, are likely to be taken to address the institutional problems 
highlighted by the Commission in its proposal of EECMA? The European Regulators’ 
Group, an important protagonist in the EECMA debate, is likely to be the focus of 
attention. Its modus operandi is likely to be made more visible to the public domain. Its 
decision making procedures have already moved away from the unanimity model, 
something likely to be reinforced, and providing an interesting parallel with the historical 
development of the EU’s own decision-making apparatus. The ERG will most likely be 
required to develop a closer relationship with the European Commission, though this has 
been to some extent occurring anyway, albeit at a slower pace than the latter would wish. 
However, it is highly unlikely than in the foreseeable future the ERG will develop along 
supranational lines. Like the broader system for telecommunications regulation that has 
developed in the EU, it will remain predominantly ‘intergovernmental’ in outlook and 
practices. There is little evidence of any appetite among Member States for further 
telecommunications market integration. More likely will be fine tuning measures in the 
direction of harmonisation, and, where necessary, liberalisation of national markets. The 
Single European Market in telecommunications looks set to continue to be a policy 
aspiration held primarily by the European Commission and a relatively small band of 
corporate business interests with the wherewithal to establish a cross-EU market 
presence. 
 
The paper contends that a move in this direction would strengthen significantly the 
European ‘regulatory’ state (Majone 1996) in telecommunications along supranational 
lines, a major qualitative shift of approach to that developed thus far.  However, the 
rejection of EECMA by EU Member States did still result in a rise in the ERG’s  and the 
European Commission’s regulatory powers, constituting a much more path-dependent 
development of EU telecommunications policy.  Though the idea of creating a European 
regulatory authority for telecommunications has been floated in the past by the 
Commission (Bartle 2001), its creation has been quite firmly resisted by Member States. 
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